We examine the relation between accruals quality and internal controls using 705 firms that disclosed at least one material weakness from August 2002 to November 2005 and find that weaknesses are generally associated with poorly estimated accruals that are not realized as cash flows. Further, we find that this relation between weak internal controls and lower accruals quality is driven by weakness disclosures that relate to overall company-level controls, which may be more difficult to "audit around." We find no such relation for more auditable, accountspecific weaknesses. We find similar results using four additional measures of accruals quality: discretionary accruals, average accruals quality, historical accounting restatements, and earnings persistence. Our results are robust to the inclusion of firm characteristics that proxy for difficulty in accrual estimation, known determinants of material weaknesses, and corrections for selfselection bias.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we examine the relation between accruals quality and the internal control environment of the firm. By definition, when there is a material weakness in internal control, there is "more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected" (PCAOB 2004, emphasis added) . A weak control environment has the potential to allow both 1) intentionally biased accruals through earnings management (e.g., lack of segregation of duties) and 2) unintentional errors in accrual estimation (e.g., lack of experience in estimating the bad-debt expense provision). Therefore, we hypothesize that reported material weaknesses will be associated with lower accruals quality.
While this relation has been suggested in prior literature (Kinney 2000) , the lack of internal control data has generally precluded an empirical investigation and, therefore, the literature on earnings quality has been relatively silent on the matter of internal control over financial reporting. For example, neither of the two recent publications on earnings quality (Schipper and Vincent 2003; Dechow and Schrand 2004 ) mentions a possible relation between internal control and earnings/accruals quality. In this paper, we investigate this relation using a sample of 705 companies that disclosed material weaknesses in internal control over financial Using the accruals quality measure developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) , as modified by McNichols (2002) and Francis et al. (2005) , we generally find that weak internal 1 Section 302 (applicable to all SEC filers and effective August 2002) requires that officers certify the financial statements, including the effectiveness of the internal control over financial reporting, and disclose any material changes in internal control. Section 404 (thus far effective November 2004 for accelerated filers only) requires management to issue a report on internal control over financial reporting that is subject to auditor attestation. Additional details are provided in Section II. Regardless of the origin of the material weakness disclosure, all else equal we expect these disclosures to be informative about the quality of firms' accruals. We provide sample material weaknesses in Appendix A, Section II, and Section III. controls are associated with relatively low quality accruals, as measured by weaker mappings of accruals into cash flows. This relation is robust to the inclusion of innate firm characteristics that proxy for the inherent difficulty in accrual estimation (e.g., length of the operating cycle and cash flow volatility; Dechow and Dichev 2002) and additional determinants of material weaknesses that are likely to be directly correlated with accruals quality (e.g., profitability and complexity; Ge and McVay 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007 ).
Although our focus is on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure, which we feel is both theoretically and intuitively appealing, we also consider other common proxies for accruals quality: discretionary accruals (Jones 1991) , average accruals quality (Dechow and Dichev 2002) , historical restatements (Anderson and Yohn 2002) , and earnings persistence (Schipper and Vincent 2003) . For each of these measures, we find that weak internal controls are associated with lower accruals quality.
Finally, we find that the relation between weak internal controls and lower accruals quality is stronger for two groups of firms. First, only those firms with company-level material weaknesses rather than more auditable, account-specific problems have lower accruals quality.
The finding that account-specific material weaknesses are not associated with lower accruals quality is consistent with auditors detecting and correcting auditable weaknesses through increased substantive testing prior to the issuance of the financial statements (e.g., Hogan and
Wilkins 2006).
Second, material weakness disclosures made under Section 302 (versus those under Section 404) seem to be more strongly associated with lower accruals quality. We find that, on average, Section 404 disclosures are not associated with poorer accruals quality. However, when disclosures are broken down by account-specific versus company-level weaknesses, company-level Section 404 weaknesses are associated with poorer accruals quality. Although there are several plausible explanations for the weaker results using the Section 404 disclosures, one obvious difference between Sections 302 and 404 is the increased level of scrutiny under Section 404, which requires an audit opinion on the internal controls by the external auditors. It is possible that external auditors applied a lower effective threshold for Section 404 compared to management's threshold under Section 302 and therefore identified a greater number of material weaknesses that lacked real financial reporting consequences. We discuss these results and other possible explanations later in Section IV.
Our paper makes two primary contributions. First, we extend the literature on earnings/accruals quality. Conceptually, it makes sense that a good internal control system is the foundation for high-quality financial reporting, since strong internal controls likely curtail both procedural and estimation errors, as well as earnings management. Our findings present empirical evidence to support this fundamental link between internal controls and accruals quality. In addition, our paper extends this basic research question by 1) examining the types of material weaknesses (company-level versus account-specific), 2) distinguishing between the Section 302 versus 404 reporting regimes, 3) using a cross-section of five earnings/accruals quality measures, and 4) controlling for self-selection bias through the use of both a Heckman (1979) two-stage process and a propensity score matching approach (LaLonde 1986).
Second, our paper provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of Sections 302 and 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley. These sections have been among the most cumbersome of the new legislation, with many critics alleging that the costs of compliance far exceed any benefits. We find that the most informative material weakness disclosures (i.e., those that are associated with real economic events such as lower accruals quality) are those that relate to more serious, company-wide problems for both Sections 302 and 404. Furthermore, the company-wide disclosures made under Section 302 seem to be more strongly related to lower accruals quality than the company-wide disclosures under Section 404. The disclosures of material weaknesses that report less serious, account-specific problems under both Sections 302 and 404 do not appear to be effective in our tests at identifying firms with lower financial reporting quality.
Since the implementation of Sections 302 and 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley is fairly new, there are a number of concurrent papers in this area. Our findings are generally consistent with and complementary to these other papers. First, our main finding-that material weaknesses are associated with lower accruals quality-is consistent with several other papers that examine this relation employing varying time periods, accruals quality proxies, and types of deficiencies Second, our finding that the more auditable account-specific weaknesses are not associated with lower accruals quality is complementary to Hogan and Wilkins (2006) who find that audit fees are abnormally high for firms with an internal control deficiency in the year preceding the deficiency disclosure, indicating that auditors are able to reduce the impact of poor controls through substantive testing. Finally, our conclusion that it is the internal control problem that is the root cause of the lower accruals quality is supported by Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) and Bedard (2006) who find that accruals quality improves in the year following the reported internal control problem for firms that appear to have remediated their deficiencies.
3 In sum, the papers in this area jointly present a fairly cohesive picture of how internal controls affect accruals quality.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section motivates our hypotheses, and Section III describes our sample selection and variable definitions. Section IV presents our main results, and Section V describes our robustness tests. A summary and concluding remarks are offered in the final section.
II. HYPOTHESES
Internal control over financial reporting is defined as "a process…to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting …" (PCAOB 2004, emphasis added) .
By definition, good internal control is supposed to result in more reliable financial information.
Internal controls aim to prevent and/or detect errors or fraud that could result in a misstatement of the financial statements. However, there is limited empirical evidence in the existing literature regarding the relation between the quality of internal control and the quality of accounting information. 4 A major reason is lack of data on internal control; in general, it is difficult to directly observe or verify internal control (Kinney 2000).
Our sample is generated from the disclosures of material weaknesses in internal controls that first appeared as a result of Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley, which requires that officers certify the financial statements, including the effectiveness of the internal control over financial reporting, and any material changes in internal control. Material weaknesses have also been disclosed in conjunction with Section 404 requirements, which became effective for accelerated 4 In related work, Krishnan (2005) finds that internal control problems are negatively associated with the quality of the audit committee. To the extent that audit committee quality and internal control quality are positively associated, this finding supports our hypothesis. As noted in the introduction, there are several concurrent works examining earnings quality and internal control problems (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Hogan and Wilkins 2005 for full attestation), internal control disclosures continue to be reported under Section 302 for these smaller companies. Regardless of the origin of the material weakness disclosure, all else equal we expect these disclosures to be informative about the quality of firms' accruals.
Prior research on earnings quality is generally related to accruals quality (Dechow and Schrand 2004) , and that is also the focus in this paper. Accruals can be of poor quality for two basic reasons: 1) management could intentionally bias accruals through earnings management and 2) unintentional errors in accrual estimation could occur because it is difficult to predict an uncertain future, or simply because there are insufficient controls in place to catch errors. Both of these roles have been investigated in the existing literature. With respect to earnings management, managers have been shown to use "discretionary accruals" to manage earnings in various settings, such as prior to equity offerings (e.g., Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998) . As for unintentional errors, Dechow and Dichev (2002) in estimating accruals for firms with certain characteristics (e.g., longer operating cycles). They measure the quality of accruals by the extent to which the accruals map into cash flows. In general, they find that the quality of accruals is poorer for firms with certain characteristics, such as a high proportion of losses, more volatile sales and cash flows, lower total assets, and longer operating cycles.
We expect that weaknesses in internal control will result in lower accruals quality because, by definition, they have the potential to allow errors in accrual estimation to occur and impact the reported financial statements. These potential errors include both intentional (earnings management) and unintentional (poor estimation ability) errors. For a company with weak controls, intentionally biased "discretionary" accruals could be greater by failing to limit management's ability to manage earnings (e.g., by segregating duties). Unintentional errors could be higher if weak controls result in more estimation errors for difficult to estimate accruals (e.g., by failing to ensure that qualified personnel are calculating estimates) and allow more procedural errors (e.g., by failing to have appropriate reconciliations and reviews in place). As an example, Cardiodynamic International disclosed a material weakness related to the frequency of their analysis of the inventory obsolescence provision. This material weakness most likely resulted in estimation errors related to its inventory accounts, which may have been intentional to allow the understatement of expenses. These estimation errors, caused by the material weakness in internal control, likely resulted in lower overall accruals quality for Cardiodynamic. This leads to our first hypothesis:
H1: Material weaknesses in internal control are negatively associated with accruals quality.
Our first hypothesis is based on the notion that good internal control over financial reporting is an effective internal monitoring device and results in higher quality financial reporting. However, the hypothesis does not consider external monitors. It is possible that auditors increase substantive testing when encountering weak internal controls. In other words, internal controls and substantive testing could be substitutes in producing high quality accruals (e.g., Wright and Wright 1996). Our next hypothesis, therefore, is related to the "auditability" or potential severity of the internal control weaknesses.
While a material weakness is the most severe type of internal control deficiency, within the material weakness classification the severity of internal control problems varies substantially.
Moody's (the bond-rating company) proposes that material weaknesses fall into one of two categories. Account-specific material weaknesses relate to controls over specific account balances or transaction-level processes. Moody's suggests that these types of material weaknesses are "auditable," and thus do not represent as serious a concern regarding the reliability of the financial statements. Company-level material weaknesses, however, relate to more fundamental problems such as the control environment or the overall financial reporting process, which auditors may not be able to "audit around" effectively. Moody's suggests that company-level material weaknesses call into question not only management's ability to prepare accurate financial reports but also its ability to control the business (Doss and Jonas 2004) . 6 The disclosure by Nitches, Inc., illustrates a typical "company-level" material weakness:
In October 2004, our management concluded that there were certain material weaknesses in our internal controls and procedures. The material weaknesses noted related to segregation of duties in the payroll process and in the monthly closing process; inadequate review and approval of report the same material weakness, we include only the parent company and remove the subsidiary from our control firms if the subsidiary is covered by Compustat (17 firms). We also exclude from our control sample the 100 firms identified by Compliance Week (www.complianceweek.com) as having a significant deficiency that does not reach the severity of a material weakness, in order to create a more powerful test between firms with clear internal control problems (firms reporting material weaknesses) and those with no apparent internal control problems. Next, 259 (1,974) of our material weakness (control) sample firms have insufficient data to calculate our measure of accruals quality. We also eliminate three material weakness firms and 14 control firms that were involved in a significant merger (greater than 50 percent of sales) during the accruals quality estimation period, because the merger could result in (2,943) material weakness (control) firms in our multivariate tests. 8 We summarize our sample selection process in Table 1 , Panel A.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
We next classify firms as having either a company-level or account-specific material weakness in order to test the hypothesis that more severe, company-level, weaknesses will be more negatively associated with accruals quality. We provide examples of each category in Appendix A. These classifications are mutually exclusive; if a firm has both company-level and account-specific weaknesses, we code the firm as having a company-level material weakness. In some cases, it is straightforward to categorize a disclosure as company-level; for example, when "ineffective control environment" or "management override" is specifically identified as a material weakness in the disclosure. However, most disclosures are not so forthcoming. Thus, if a firm has material weaknesses related to at least three account-specific problems, we classify the firm as having a company-level material weakness. In two cases, the firm has insufficient information to code the disclosure; we classify both of these disclosures as company-level. Of our 705 firms with non-missing accruals quality data, 426 are classified as account-specific and 279 as company-level.
Accruals Quality Measures
We use the measure of accrual estimation error developed in Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified in McNichols (2002) and Francis et al. (2005) as our main measure of accruals quality. This measure defines the quality of accruals as the extent to which they map into past, current, and future cash flows. We assume that this measure can capture the effect of internal control on accruals quality for two reasons. First, a large number of disclosed material weaknesses are related to specific accounts (e.g., inventory; Ge and McVay 2005) . These specific accounts could have estimation errors that will be captured by this measure. For example, if the inventory account is overstated, the obsolete inventory will not result in cash inflows in the next period, resulting in a low correlation between the accrual and realized cash flows. Second, compared to other measures of accruals quality, the measure in Dechow and Dichev (2002) does not rely solely on earnings management or assumptions related to market efficiency (e.g., value-relevance). This measure can capture both biased "discretionary" accruals and unintentionally poorly estimated accruals, which we predict will be the result of an internal control system with material weaknesses.
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Specifically, the proxy for accruals quality is measured by estimating the following regression by industry and year:
The residuals from the regression measure the extent to which current accruals ( WC) do not effectively map into past, present, or future cash flows (CFO). [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] , since the regression requires data from the past and future years. We then aggregate the residuals by firm and calculate the standard deviation of residuals (AQ), by firm, requiring a minimum of four years of data out of the seven years. A higher standard deviation indicates lower accruals quality.
9 Roychowdhury (2006) , among others, shows that firms appear to manipulate real operating activities in order to "manage" earnings. However, such an action is not a violation of generally accepted accounting principles, and thus we do not expect good internal control to constrain this behavior. 10 We define the change in working capital accruals from year t-1 to t as WC = Accounts Receivable + Inventory -Accounts Payable -Taxes Payable + Other Assets, or WC = -(data item 302 + data item 303 + data item 304 + data item 305 + data item 307). CFO is cash flow from operations (data item 308). All variables in equation (1) are scaled by average total assets (data item 6) and winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles, by year.
As with any proxy, our measure of accruals quality has limitations. As noted in
McNichols (2002), the Dechow and Dichev approach limits the applicability of the model to accruals that are short term in nature (i.e., working capital accruals). In addition, the definition of accruals quality is symmetric for estimation errors that overstate and understate cash flow realizations by an equal amount, which may be problematic in certain settings, although less of a concern in our setting as unintentional errors are not expected to be systematically over-or understated. Moreover, a sizable fraction of the explanatory power of the measure is attributable to the negative contemporaneous association between accruals and cash flows. To the extent that this contemporaneous component does not capture accruals quality, it can handicap the ability of the Dechow and Dichev model to capture accruals quality (Wysocki 2006) . Finally, as with any measure, to the extent that we do not properly control for the joint determinants of both accruals quality and material weaknesses, our conclusions would not be warranted.
In order to further validate our results and to enhance comparison with other research on earnings quality, we also examine four additional proxies of earnings/accruals quality. The first is Discretionary Accruals, which is the average of the absolute value of discretionary accruals, estimated following Becker et al. (1998) and Kothari et al. (2005) . 11 Our second alternative proxy, Average Accruals Quality, is suggested in Dechow and Dichev (2002) . This measure, the average of the absolute value of the firm residuals from equation (1), is estimated in the crosssection and is highly correlated with our main accruals quality measure (the standard deviation of the residuals). an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm was listed by the General Accounting Office (GAO) as having had a restatement from January 1997 through December 2002. Intuitively, in order for a restatement to occur, an error (either intentional or unintentional) must have been made. Therefore, while our Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure attempts to capture these errors through the realization of cash flows, restatements provide explicit evidence of these errors.
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Our final alternative measure of accruals quality is Earnings Persistence (Dechow and Dichev 2002; Schipper and Vincent 2003) . These four alternative measures are defined in Table 1 ,
Timing of the Measurement of Accruals Quality
Since internal control disclosures were not widely available prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, it is difficult to determine how long the newly disclosed weaknesses have existed in the company. This has implications for the time period over which we measure our accruals quality variable. In our paper, we assume that the weaknesses, on average, have existed several years prior to their disclosure, if not since the firm's inception. Each of our proxies for accruals quality is measured from 1996 to 2002, which results in almost no overlap with the financial periods in which the weaknesses were reported. We can infer from the descriptions that many of the disclosures have been around for some time. For example, 3D Systems had the following disclosure:
Specifically, our revenue recognition policies and procedures were poorly documented and not readily accessible to most of our employees. Our documentation for machine sales transactions was inconsistent and not adequately defined. Furthermore, the then existing policies and procedures [were] broadbased, and did not include specific procedures and controls by department or function. Moreover, our accounting and finance staff were inadequate to meet the needs of an international public company.
It seems unlikely that 3D Systems did not have these problems in the recent years preceding the disclosure. Rather, it seems likely that Sarbanes-Oxley led to the disclosure of a situation that had existed for some time. As another example, Sonix Research Inc., reported the following:
Due to its small size and limited financial resources, however, the Company's chief financial officer, a member of management, has been the only employee involved in accounting and financial reporting. The Board of Directors has recognized that as a result, there is no segregation of duties within the accounting function, leaving all aspects of financial reporting and physical control of cash and equivalents in the hands of the same employee. Usually, this lack of segregation of duties represents a material weakness in a company's internal control over financial reporting; however, based on the demonstrated integrity and trustworthiness of the Company's chief financial officer, the Board of Directors has had confidence that there have been no irregularities in the Company's financial reporting or in the protection of its assets.
The above condition has probably existed since the firm's inception. Clearly, not all the material weakness disclosures are long-standing; however, in our study we operate under the assumption that, on average, these problems have been around for multiple years, and measure our accruals quality proxies over the preceding seven years (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) ).
An alternative approach is to measure accruals quality in the same period that the material weakness was reported. We choose not to use this approach because the impending disclosure of an internal control weakness may cause management and/or the auditor to intensify their search for misestimated accruals, resulting in more write-downs and thereby lower accruals quality (Hogan and Wilkins 2005) . If these low-quality accruals do not result from the company's poor internal controls per se, a lower concurrent accruals quality measure could be misattributed to the control system. Our use of an accruals quality measure that is calculated in the periods preceding the material weakness disclosure helps to address this competing explanation that auditors applied additional scrutiny and conservatism to the firms that they knew would be publicly disclosing their internal control problems. Dechow and Dichev (2002) find that accruals quality is poorer for firms with certain characteristics, such as for smaller firms. We expect that internal control weaknesses will reduce accruals quality beyond that explained by these innate firm characteristics. While Dechow and Dichev (2002) find that smaller firms tend to have lower quality accruals, we expect that, for two equally small firms, the company with weak internal controls will have lower accruals quality.
Innate Firm Characteristics that Affect the Quality of Accruals
For this reason, we include these five innate firm variables as controls in our analysis: Loss Proportion, Sales Volatility, Cash Flow (CFO) Volatility, Total Assets, and Operating Cycle, as we wish to focus on the effect of the internal control problem, rather than generic volatility or a firm's operating cycle (see Table 1 , Panel B for variable definitions).
Prior research has also identified determinants of material weaknesses in internal control.
Material weakness firms tend to be less profitable, smaller, younger, more complex, growing rapidly, or undergoing restructuring (e.g., Krishnan 2005; Ge and McVay 2005; AshbaughSkaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007) . 13 As these characteristics may have a direct effect on accruals quality, we include one proxy for each of these constructs in our main regressions as follows: the size of the firm (Total Assets), the age of the firm (Firm Age), profitability (Loss Proportion), the complexity of the firm's operations (Segments), rapid growth (Extreme Sales Growth), and restructurings (Restructuring Charge); see Table 1 , Panel B for definitions.
13 Krishnan (2005) finds that internal control problems and audit committee quality are negatively associated. We examine this variable in a sensitivity analysis in Section V; our results are not sensitive to its inclusion. account-specific weaknesses. The innate variables associated with lower accruals quality also tend to be higher for the company-level disclosure firms, supporting the need for these control variables when testing H2. For example, firms with company-level disclosures tend to have more losses and greater sales and cash flow volatility compared to their account-specific counterparts. They also have lower average cash flows and earnings before extraordinary items, and higher working capital accruals (not tabulated). Account-specific disclosure firms tend to be slightly larger and older and have more segments than company-level disclosure firms, consistent with the notion that the additional complexity associated with size and decentralization creates unique challenges for these firms (Doyle et al. 2007 ).
IV. RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis
Turning to Table 3 , which presents a correlation matrix for the main variables, material weakness firms are positively correlated with most of the innate characteristics of firms with poor accruals quality identified in Dechow and Dichev (2002) . Material weakness disclosures are positively associated with a higher proportion of losses, higher cash flow and sales volatility, and longer operating cycles, which raises the possibility that these innate firm characteristics are driving the lower accruals quality, and not the material weaknesses per se. Our multivariate analyses below investigate our hypotheses further.
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[Insert Table 3 about here]
Multivariate Analysis of Accruals Quality and Material Weaknesses
The first column of results in Table 4 contains the regression estimates of accruals quality on an indicator variable, material weakness (MW), where MW is equal to one if the firm reports a material weakness and zero if the firm is in the control group. We present our primary accruals quality measure (AQ) as the dependent variable (recall that a higher value represents lower accruals quality) and control for the innate firm characteristics related to accruals quality as well as the determinants of material weaknesses. As noted above, we include only one proxy for each of the determinants of material weaknesses for succinctness. Results are not sensitive to the inclusion of the comprehensive list of variables; the coefficient on MW is 0.004 with a p-value of 0.003 when all variables are included.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Our main variable of interest, MW, is positively related to the accruals quality measure (tstatistic = 2.51), supporting H1 and suggesting material weakness firms have poorer accruals quality. The economic magnitude of the coefficient on MW (α = 0.004) is also significant. For the typical control firm (median Accruals Quality of 0.042 from Table 2 , Panel A) a switch from 15 As several of our variables are correlated at 0.40 or more, we examine the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each of our multivariate regressions below to help ensure that multicollinearity is not a major concern. None of our calculated VIFs exceed two, which is well below the level indicating harmful multicollinearity (Kennedy 1998, p. 190) .
MW=0
to MW=1 results in a 9.5 percent (0.004 divided by 0.042) increase in the accruals quality metric (implying poorer accruals quality), after controlling for other known determinants of accruals quality. Turning to our control variables, each of the variables measuring innate firm characteristics that are expected to affect accruals quality is significant in the predicted direction (Dechow and Dichev 2002) . Finally, the additional controls we identified through our examination of the internal control literature are largely insignificant.
We next examine the relation between accruals quality and the different types of internal control deficiencies. H2 predicts that company-level material weaknesses will have a stronger association with accruals quality than will account-specific material weaknesses, since companylevel internal control deficiencies are less "auditable" and thus more likely to result in erroneous accruals in the filed financial statements. As in our earlier tests, we control for the innate firm characteristics that proxy for the inherent difficulty in accrual estimation and the determinants of material weaknesses.
Referring to the second column of results in Table 4 , account-specific material weaknesses are not significantly associated with accruals quality (t-statistic = 0.94) while company-level material weaknesses are positively related to AQ (t-statistic = 3.09). Consistent with H2, the magnitude of the coefficient on account-specific weaknesses (α = 0.002) is significantly lower than the magnitude of the coefficient on company-level weaknesses (α = 0.007) under an F-test (p = 0.057, two-tailed). Economically speaking, the presence of a company-level (account-specific) material weakness is expected to be associated with a standard deviation that is 16.7 (4.8) percent larger than the control firms.
Our finding that account-specific internal control problems are not significantly associated with lower accruals quality complements Hogan and Wilkins (2006) , who find that auditor fees were significantly higher for material weakness firms in the year prior to the disclosure of a significant deficiency. Thus, our combined results are consistent with auditors historically "auditing around" the account-specific internal control problems, thereby mitigating the negative impact on accruals quality.
Multivariate Analysis of Additional Accruals Quality Variables
In Table 5 , we replicate our main results for our four additional measures of accruals quality. Referring to the first column of results in Table 5 , consistent with Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), material weakness disclosures are positively associated with Discretionary Accruals (t-statistic = 1.89). 16 We parse out account-specific and company-level problems in the second column of results. While the coefficient on company-level problems appears to be larger in magnitude than that on account-specific weaknesses, consistent with our main results, the coefficients are not significantly different from one another under an F-test (p = 0.410, twotailed).
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Our second alternative proxy, Average Accruals Quality, is presented in the third and fourth columns of results in Table 5 . Given the fact that this variable is highly correlated with our primary accruals quality measure, it is not surprising that the results are very similar to those shown in Table 4 and continue to support H1 and H2; the coefficients on account-specific and company-level weaknesses are significantly different under an F-test (p = 0.063, two-tailed).
In the third set of columns in Table 5 we present the estimates from a logistic regression,
where Historical Restatement is equal to one if the company had a restatement from 1997-2002.
The coefficient on MW is positive and significant ( 2 = 12.21), and the breakdown by type is consistent with the results above-lower accruals quality is driven by the company-level weaknesses. The difference between the coefficients is statistically significant under an F-test (p = 0.008, two-tailed).
Our final alternative measure of accruals quality is Earnings Persistence, presented in the final two columns in Table 5 . We interact MW with Earnings (Compustat data item #123 scaled by average total assets) to evaluate the incremental persistence of material weakness firms for
2002. The interaction term on MW is negative and significant (-0.067; t-statistic = 2.73), suggesting again that the earnings/accruals quality of material weakness firms is poorer than that of our control firms. Finally, referring to the final column of results, MW is only negatively related to earnings persistence for company-level weaknesses, and this coefficient is statistically different from that on account-specific weaknesses under an F-test (p = 0.001, two-tailed).
Overall, the multivariate results support the notion that accruals quality is lower when a firm has a weak internal control system (H1) and that this relation is stronger when the internal control problems are at the company level (H2). These results are consistent across the different proxies for accruals quality.
Analysis by Reporting Regime
As mentioned earlier, material weakness disclosures under Section 404 are likely to be different than those under Section 302. In this section, we investigate how these differences affect our study. In Table 6 , we re-estimate our regressions separately for the 302 and 404 subgroups. The coefficients on the MW variable (t-statistic = 3.22) and the company-level variable (t-statistic = 3.73) are strongly positive for 302 reporters, consistent with the full sample results.
For Section 404 filers, the results are similar, but quite a bit weaker. The main driver of lower accruals quality, company-wide material weaknesses, is still significant (t-statistic = 2.00), but the coefficient value for Section 404 (0.005) is about half of the coefficient for Section 302 (0.011). This reduced effect translates into an overall coefficient on the MW variable that is now insignificant for the average Section 404 material weakness disclosure (t-statistic = 0.95).
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[Insert Table 6 about here]
There are several possible explanations for the weaker results for the Section 404 subgroup. First, the increased scrutiny of a full Section 404 audit and the fact that the external auditor must sign off on an opinion regarding the company's controls may be causing auditors to be unduly cautious in identifying material weaknesses. This lower effective threshold for Section 404 material weaknesses could result in many reported weaknesses that are not related to real financial reporting consequences. Supporting this idea, the percentage of less-severe, account-specific material weaknesses rises from 58 percent of our Section 302 disclosures to 64 percent of our Section 404 disclosures. Interestingly, if we exclude the 86 Section 404 material weakness disclosure firms that also filed a material weakness under Section 302, the remaining 291 Section 404 material weakness disclosures are not associated with accruals quality in any of our regressions. Unfortunately, we are not able to discern how long the 291 internal control problems have been in existence (see Section 3). Because our accruals quality variable is measured from 1996-2002, new internal control problems are not expected to be associated with our measure. 18 Note that this increase in account-specific weaknesses would not explain our result showing a weaker relation for company-level disclosures. However, it is also possible that the language imposed by auditors describing weaknesses is more severe under Section 404 causing us to code some account-specific weaknesses as more severe, company-level types, which would dilute the power of our tests.
control for these specific factors in our tests in Table 6 , these controls may be incomplete. Future tests on Section 404 disclosures that include smaller, non-accelerated filers may yield different results from those shown in Table 6 .
Finally, while the disclosure of material weaknesses is mandatory under Section 404, ambiguity exists as to whether material weaknesses are required to be disclosed under Section 302. 19 If a large number of firms are treating material weakness disclosures under Section 302 as voluntary, it is possible that many firms are choosing not to report less severe Section 302 material weaknesses, thus leaving a reported 302 sample that is more serious in nature and more correlated with poor accruals quality.
Overall, the results seem to indicate that the Section 404 material weakness disclosures are less informative in identifying firms with real financial reporting concerns (e.g., lower
accruals/earnings quality). This finding is especially important given the high cost of compliance with Section 404. However, given the limitations noted above for the initial Section 404 disclosures in our sample, future tests using a longer time-series and a more inclusive 404 sample may find different results.
19 While Question 9 of the SEC's Frequently Asked Questions (SEC 2004) seems to imply that firms should only "carefully consider" whether to publicly disclose material weaknesses under Section 302, Question 11 states without reserve that " [a] registrant is obligated to identify and publicly disclose all material weaknesses." Confusion arises due to the existence of two largely overlapping definitions of controls ("disclosure controls and procedures" and "internal controls over financial reporting"), two reporting regimes (Sections 302 and 404), and two tiers of reporting requirements (accelerated vs. non-accelerated filers). Although some firms might interpret the material weakness disclosure requirement under Section 302 as voluntary, our reading of the bulk of SEC guidance and many firms' begrudging material weakness disclosures seems to indicate that most firms are treating the disclosure as mandatory.
V. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Self-Selection of Internal Control Quality
In our main analysis, we include known determinants of material weaknesses as independent variables and focus on material weaknesses (the most severe problems), which are effectively required to be disclosed, thereby eliminating much of the choice to disclose (see footnote 19). Nevertheless, it is still possible that firms can choose both the quality of their internal controls and their efforts to discover and disclose any known weaknesses (AshbaughSkaife et al. 2007 ). This choice introduces possible self-selection bias into our observed sample.
In this section, we econometrically control for self-selection bias in two ways. First, we use a two-stage approach and estimate a probit regression of MW on the determinants of material weaknesses. This first-stage regression closely follows Doyle et al. (2007) and is presented in Appendix B. From this first-stage regression, which identifies the likelihood of a firm being "selected" as a material weakness firm, we calculate the inverse Mills ratio (see Heckman 1979; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000) and include this ratio in our accruals quality regressions. Including the ratio in our main regressions helps control for the likelihood of self-selecting into the material weakness group. As shown in Table 7 , after including the inverse Mills ratio, the results are similar to those in Table 4 . The coefficient estimate of MW in the first column of Table 7 becomes 0.010 (t-statistic = 2.08) and the coefficient for the company-level material weaknesses in the second column is 0.013 (t-statistic = 2.53).
20
[Insert Table 7 about here] 20 We consider multiple additional variables in our first stage regression to ensure that we are properly controlling for volatility and performance. Specifically, we have considered: sales volatility, cash flow volatility, the rank of market-adjusted stock returns, and an indicator variable if sales growth falls into the lowest quintile in a given industry. Results are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with those presented. Second, we control for self-selection by creating a matched sample based on the predicted probabilities from the first-stage probit regression. This method, known as propensity score matching (LaLonde 1986), creates a nonmaterial-weakness control sample with the same predicted probabilities of having a material weakness. The propensity score matching method produces a matched sample of 645 control firms, which meet the data requirements to test H1.
When using a matched sample, the results shown in the third and fourth columns of Table 7 are similar to those in Table 4 . The coefficient estimate on MW in the third column of Table 7 is 0.004 (t-statistic = 1.71) and the coefficient for the company-level material weaknesses in the fourth column is 0.007 (t-statistic = 2.39).
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Auditor Type and Auditor Changes Sensitivity Analysis
Both auditor type and auditor changes have been shown to be associated with disclosing an internal control problem. Ge and McVay (2005) document that auditor changes are also positively associated with the disclosure of internal control problems. Both auditor type and auditor changes have also been shown to be associated with accruals quality (Becker et al. 1998; DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; Francis et al. 1999) .
In this section, we consider the effects of both auditor type and auditor changes on the association between accruals quality and material weakness disclosures. 21 An alternative way to test our hypotheses using the propensity score match approach is to take the differences of the variables between the test and matched control firms and test the significance of the intercept coefficient. Results are very similar using this alternative approach. For all material weaknesses, the intercept coefficient is positive and significant; 0.004 with a p-value of 0.051. The intercept coefficient is insignificant for account-specific weaknesses (p-value of 0.348) and positive and significant for company-level weaknesses (0.007 with a p-value of 0.044).
As our accruals quality measure spans 1996-2002, we track the auditor for each of the firms in our sample across these years. We then create three new variables. Big N is the proportion of years the company was audited by a Big N audit firm; this variable has an insample mean of 86 percent. Large Auditor is the proportion of years the company was audited by a large auditor (described above); this variable has an in-sample mean of 91 percent. We also create a variable Auditor Change, which is the proportion of years the company changed its audit firm (excluding changes due to mergers); this variable has an in-sample mean of nine percent. In general, we expect firms audited by larger auditors to have higher accruals quality (i.e., we expect a negative sign on auditor type). As DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) only consider the two years around the auditor change, while we consider a seven-year span, we do not have a predicted sign on auditor change.
We find that across both measures of auditor size (Big N and Large Auditor), the larger auditors are associated with higher accruals quality, and Auditor Change is associated with lower accruals quality. Including these additional controls does not affect our inferences regarding internal control quality-material weakness disclosures continue to be associated with poorer accruals quality (t-statistic = 2.60 and 2.66 with Big N and Large Auditor, respectively).
Audit Committee Quality Sensitivity Analysis
Krishnan (2005) observations with sufficient data. We find that MW remains strongly associated with poorer accruals quality (t-statistic = 3.15), while the percentage of independent directors is associated with better accruals quality (t-statistic = 1.80). This finding suggests that the relation between internal control and accruals quality goes beyond the effect of corporate governance on accruals quality documented in the prior literature.
VI. CONCLUSION
We examine the relation between accruals quality and internal control quality and find that firms with weak internal control over financial reporting generally have lower accruals quality. We measure accruals quality as the extent to which accruals are realized as cash flows, following Dechow and Dichev (2002) . We identify weak internal control firms as those that disclosed a material weakness in internal control from August 2002 to November 2005 under Sections 302 and 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley. The relation between weak internal controls and poor accruals quality holds after controlling for known determinants of both accruals quality and internal control deficiencies. Moreover, the results are robust to corrections for self-selection bias using both the inverse Mills ratio approach and propensity score matching.
We examine four additional proxies of accruals quality: discretionary accruals, the average absolute value of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) residuals, historical restatements, and earnings persistence. Our results are consistent using each of these alternative proxies. The results also seem to be consistent when measuring these variables concurrently in the year of material weakness disclosure, rather than over a preceding time period.
Finally, we explore the severity of the material weaknesses (account-specific versus company-level) and the reporting regime (Section 302 versus Section 404). We find that those firms with company-level material weaknesses rather than more auditable, account-specific problems drive the relation between weak internal controls and lower accruals quality. This result is consistent for both Sections 302 and 404 disclosures, although we find that material weakness disclosures made under Section 302 are more strongly associated with lower accruals quality than those under Section 404.
Our study has several limitations. First, we rely on the disclosure of a material weakness to proxy for the actual presence of an internal control problem. Therefore, to the extent that there is a systematic bias in the choice to identify and disclose material weaknesses-beyond those variables used as controls-our sample may not represent the true underlying population of firms with internal control problems. Second, we assume that the material weaknesses have been present for multiple years; our accruals quality measure is constructed from 1996-2002.
However, it is hard to pinpoint the exact timing of the weaknesses and this assumption may not be valid. Third, since Sarbanes-Oxley has been in effect for a relatively short time, our ability to infer causality between internal control problems and accruals quality is limited. Finally, we must rely on a proxy for accruals quality. We use the model developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) Our findings have implications for regulators, auditors, managers, and researchers. First, our findings support the notion that the internal control environment is a fundamental element in the production of high quality accruals, a link that has long been suggested (Kinney 2000) but was largely untestable prior to the introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley Sections 302 and 404.
Second, our findings add to the debate on the benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley, suggesting that company-level material weakness disclosures are, at least in part, appropriately identifying "poor quality" firms-specifically, those with poor accruals quality. However, the results in this paper show no such benefits from the disclosure of more auditable, account-specific weaknesses.
Finally, our findings support the notion that at least some portion of accruals quality is incremental to the innate drivers of poor accruals quality, such as firm size or sales volatility, and thus subject to improvement by managers. 
Discretionary Accruals
The average of the absolute value of discretionary accruals from 1996-2002, where discretionary accruals are calculated following Becker et al. (1998) Average Accruals Quality 
Earnings Persistence
The coefficient on earnings from a cross-sectional regression of current earnings on one-year-ahead earnings estimated from 1996-2002
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